Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
Political Science Faculty Publications

Political Science Department

Fall 2005

The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision
Making in the European Union
Jeffrey Lewis
Cleveland State University, j.lewis07@csuohio.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clpolsci_facpub

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!

Publisher's Statement
Copyright 2005 Cambridge University Press. Available on publisher's site at
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020818305050320.
Original Citation
Lewis, Jeffrey. 2005. "The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the
European Union." International Organization 59:937-971.

Repository Citation

Lewis, Jeffrey, "The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union"
(2005). Political Science Faculty Publications. 16.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clpolsci_facpub/16
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at
EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications by an
authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
library.es@csuohio.edu.

The Janus Face of Brussels:
Socialization and Everyday Decision
Making in the European Union
Jeffrey Lewis

This article examines the EuropeanUnion's Committee of Permanent
Abstract
Representatives,or COREPER,a group composed of the EU permanentrepresentatives (permreps)and responsible for preparingupcoming ministerial meetings of the
Council. As the heart of everyday decision making in the EU, COREPERis a key
laboratoryto test whetherand how nationalofficials become socialized into a Brusselsbased collective culture and what difference this makes for EU negotiations. The key
scope conditions for COREPER socialization are high issue density/intensity and
insulation from domestic politics. COREPERalso displays a range of socialization
mechanisms, including strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion.
Based on extensive interview data and a detailed case study of negotiations for a
controversial EU citizenship directive, this article documents a socialization pathway in COREPERmarkedby adherenceto a set of norm-guidedrules and principled
beliefs in collectively legitimatingargumentsand makingdecisions. COREPERsocialization does not indicate a patternof national identities being replaced or subsumed;
rather,the evidence points to a socialization process based on a "logic of appropriateness" and an expanded conception of the self.

Not many international institutional environments can match the density or robustness of collective decision-making norms found in the European Union (EU).'
But there are surprisingly few empirical studies of how these collective norms
operate in the EU. There is an even greater shortfall of research on the effects of
this institutional environment on the basic actor properties of the national officials
who participate in this system.2 How does the culture of decision making in the
EU affect agents and their bargaining behavior? This article focuses on the Com-

For feedback on earlier versions, I am grateful to the project participants and especially Jeffrey
Checkel, Matthew Evangelista, Iain Johnston, and Michael Zuirn.I thank the editors and two anonymous reviewers for comments that greatly improved the final product. I also acknowledge generous
support from the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies and the American Political Science
Association's Small GrantProgram,which fundedportions of field researchassociated with this project.
1. For a discussion of this point, see Kahler 1995, 82-89; and Wallace 1994, 41-50.
2. Recent exceptions include Trondal 2001 and 2002; Egeberg 2004 and 1999; Egeberg, Schaefer,
and Trondal2003; and Joerges and Vos 1999.
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mittee of PermanentRepresentatives (COREPER),a Brussels institution responsible for preparingupcoming ministerial meetings of the Council, and, as such,
the heart of "everyday"EU decision making.3The membersof COREPER,known
as the EU permanentrepresentatives,are exemplars of "state agents" given their
prominence in articulating, arguing, and defending national interests across the
gamut of EU affairs.4COREPERis thus a key laboratoryto test whetherand how
state agents become socialized into a Brussels-basedcultureof EU decision making.
COREPERis the main preparatorybody for the Council of the EuropeanUnion,
the legislative heart and unabasheddefender of national interests in the EU. Composed of senior civil servants and career diplomats, COREPER members meet
weekly and have evolved a style of decision making that is rooted in a collective
culture with its own informal norms, rules, and discourse.5 Some permanentrepresentativeseven joke that this collective culturemakes them unpopularwith home
ministries;for example, GermanAmbassadorDietrich von Kyaw claimed that back
home he was known as the stiindiger Verrater(permanenttraitor)instead of the
stdindigerVertreter(permanentrepresentative).6
The central question of this article is whether and how the context and quality
of interactionamong national representativesin COREPERcan have transformative effects on basic actor properties.Unlike traditionalrationalistaccounts, which
begin from the premise that institutionalenvironmentsprimarilyaffect strategy,7
this article seeks to test constructivist claims that institutional environments can
also affect cognition, attitudes,and identity. Ratherthan posing this as an "either/
or" question, to competitively test rationalism "versus"constructivism, this article asks whether the constructivist line of questioning can add value to baseline
rationalist accounts. Based on an original data set of interviews with participants
and case-study research of negotiation histories, this article documents how
COREPERoffers an unambiguousexample of interstatenegotiationin which state
actors' range of motivations include a blend of appropriatenessand consequentialist logics.8

3. Since 1962, COREPER has met weekly in two formats: COREPER II is composed of the EU
ambassadorsand works primarily on the monthly meetings of the foreign ministers in the General
Affairs Council (GAC); COREPER I is made up of the EU Deputies, and they preside over a wide
range of so-called "technical"Councils such as the Environment,Fisheries, Employment and Social
Policy, and so on. Thus, strictly speaking, COREPERconsists of fifty members (twenty-five ambassadors, and twenty-five deputies) who are jointly referredto as the EU permanentrepresentatives.For
the more subtle differences in prestige and clout between COREPER I and II, see Lewis 2002; and
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997.
4. There are two substantive exceptions: the AgriculturalCouncil (which is preparedby the Standing Committee on Agriculture[SCA]) and the Ecofin Council (preparedby the Economic and Finance
Committee [EFC], which has its own vertical channels to the finance ministers, effectively bypassing
COREPER).
5. See Lewis 2000; and Bostock 2002.
6. Dietrich von Kyaw was Germany'sEU Ambassadorfrom 1993-99. For a discussion of his Verriiter quip, see Lionel Barber, "The Men Who Run Europe," The Financial Times, 11 March 1995,
Sec. 2, I-II. See also Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, 224-25; and Wallace 1973, 56.
7. For examples, see Eising 2002, 87; and Bjurulf and Elgstrdm 2004.
8. March and Olsen 1998.
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Following Checkel's definitionof socialization as "a process of inductingactors
into the norms and rules of a given community,"9 this article tracks how
COREPER participants exhibit a range of behavior and collectively legitimate
argumentson the basis of a "reasonedconsensus" that the logic of consequences
by itself cannot explain. The outcome of socialization is the internalization of
group-community standards by the EU permanent representatives (permreps),
reflected in bargainingbehavior and decision outcomes. Successful socialization,
then, is evidenced by what Checkel calls "sustained compliance based on the
internalizationof... new norms and rules."10 Furthermore,fine-grainedanalysis
of the EU local elections negotiations (as will be discussed in the fourth section)
will allow more nuanced discriminationbetween Type I (role playing) and Type
II (normative suasion) patternsof internalization."
Joining the COREPER"club"involves more thanbehaviorialadaptationto institutional norms that alter incentives and strategies. EU permreps also internalize
group-communitystandardsthatbecome partof an expandedconceptionof the self.
This internalizationincludes a distinct epistemic value in the collective decisionmaking process itself.12 The standards of appropriatenessfound in COREPER
include normsrulingout certaininstrumentalbehavior(such as "pushingfor a vote"
underconditionsof qualifiedmajorityvoting), obligationsto practicemutualresponsiveness and collectively legitimate arguments (including appropriatenessstandards for droppingargumentsthat fail to convince the group), and a duty to "find
solutions" and keep the legislative agenda of the Council moving forward. However, this collective culture does not trigger shifts of loyalty or transfersof allegiance. Instead,one sees a more complex layering of nationalandEuropeanframes.
The interviewdataconsistentlyshow thatEU permrepsdo not perceive sharptradeoffs between nationaland Europeanallegiances. When discussing theirjob descriptions, permrepsfrequentlyrefer to having dual personalities, performingmultiple
roles, wearing differenthats, even having a "Janusface." 13 As formerBritish Deputy PermanentRepresentativeDavid Bostock explains:
Members of COREPERdescribe themselves as being bound by a "dual loyalty."It is their responsibilityfaithfully to representtheir Member States; but
it is also their responsibility to reach agreement.The Roman god Janus, facing in two directions,is thus COREPER'spatronsaint,mascot, or role model.14
Thus the identity configurationof EU permrepsappears,even at first glance, more
subtle and complex than zero-sum notions of loyalty and allegiance. In COREPER,

9. Checkel, this volume.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. This is compatible with what Lax and Sebenius call the development of "process interests"or
"intrinsicinterests in the characterof the negotiation process itself." Lax and Sebenius 1986, 72.
13. Author's interview, 20 February1996. All interviews were conducted in Brussels unless noted
otherwise.
14. Bostock 2002, 217.
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what one sees instead is the cognitive blurring of sharp definitional boundaries
between the "national"and "European"frames, and a shared sense of responsibility to deliver both at home and collectively. As this article will show, the pattern
of socialization found in COREPERdoes not lead to the creation of a new overarching supranationalidentity,but ratherto a more complex configurationof identity than is typically acknowledged.
The remainderof this article is organized as follows. The next section provides
a concise summary of the theoretical argument. The second section details the
pathway of socialization found in COREPER,with an emphasis on the scope conditions and mechanisms at work. The necessary scope conditions are high issue
density/intensity and insulation from domestic politics, both of which imply that
the socialization process in COREPERis forged by the "quality"of the link. The
mechanisms explaining how socialization occurs in this institutionalenvironment
include strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion. Following this,
the third section discusses methods and the strategy of empirical triangulation.
Section four contains the empirical story, which traces the negotiations of a controversial EU citizenship directive that was quietly resolved by COREPER and
sent to the ministers for formal adoption. Specifically, the case covers the 1994
local elections directive grantingall EU citizens the right to vote and run for office
in the local elections of their currentresidence (that is, granting nonnationalEU
citizens local voting and participationrights). Finally, a brief concluding section
summarizeshow the identity configurationof permrepsmuddies conventional distinctions between "national"and "supranational"agency.

Overview of the Theoretical Argument
For rationalists,identities and interestsare takenas preset and given, and the empirical focus is on the role of formal decision rules, relative power, and instrumental
rationality in explaining bargainingoutcomes.15 State agents are motivated more
by a "logic of anticipatedconsequences and prior preferences"16 than by notions
of responsibility, obligation, or informal, "soft law" rules and norms. In the rationalists' strategic conception of rules, actors employ language and communication as rhetorical devices to pursue instrumentalinterests, manipulate incentive
structuresvia social influence, and so on.17 Normative compliance is the result of
crafted,calculativereasoningand expected futurebenefits.While institutionalenvironments have constraining and enabling effects on behavior by altering incentives, the impact of institutions on basic actor properties (attitudes, identities) is
considered epiphenomenal.
Constructivismrelaxes the assumption of preset, given interests and identities,
allowing for the possibility that institutionalenvironmentsmay have transforma15. Moravcsik 1998.
16. March and Olsen 1998, 949.
17. See Schimmelfennig 2000; and Schimmelfennig, this volume.

Socialization and Decision Making in the EuropeanUnion 941

tive effects on basic actor properties. Relative power brokeringand instrumental
rationality are accorded less primacy than in rationalism, and supplementedwith
attention to the deliberative aspects of negotiation, such as the role of discourse,
persuasion, and the collective legitimation of arguments.According to the constructivist approach,EU institutions are hypothesized to have "thick"socializing
effects on actors, which go beyond instrumentaladaptationand strategic calculation to include the internalizationof norms and rules into self-conceptions. In other
words, the densities of institutional and normative environments are considered
causal variables that, underthe right backgroundconditions, can have transformative effects on basic actor properties, including how individuals see themselves
(conceptions of the self) and how they conceptualize their interests. In the case of
successful socialization, then, the constructivistexpects to see interests that "have
been conditioned by a community standardthat delimits the acceptable."18As the
case evidence will show, one can furtherdistinguish the internalizednorms argument into Type I cases, where agents follow "socially expected behaviorin a given
setting or community,"and Type II cases of accepting community norms as "the
right thing to do." 19
The socialization story documented here does not disprove or contradict a rationalist reading,20but at the same time there is abundantsupport for a "soft"
constructivist account that brings the collective culture and normative environment of Brussels-based decision making into the picture. Essentially, what one
sees in the institutionalenvironmentof COREPERamong the EU permrepsis an
expanded conception of the self that includes noninstrumental,pro-normbehavior
without the threatof external sanctioning;it is based on the internalizationof standards of appropriateness.This can be consistent with rationalism,but it is necessary to expandthe baseline of "self-interest"beyond utility maximizationto include
a wider range of egoistic and other-regardingperspectives. As such, this study
joins a growing numberof researcherswho see value in developing more nuanced
models of rationalitybeyond the instrumentalunderstandingembedded in nearly
all forms of rational choice.21
Alternative Explanations: InternalizedNorms or Diplomacy 101?
The alternativeexplanation for everyday EU decision making is standardnegotiation theory and two-level games analysis.22The falsification test for the social18. Hurd 1999, 397.
19. Checkel, this volume.
20. See Ziirn and Checkel, for a thoughtful "double interpretation."
21. For a discussion of different"models of theoreticaldialogue"between rationalismand constructivism, including the tricky issues of "paradigmaticprivileging" and "first mover" advantages, see
Jupille et al. 2003, 19-28.
22. The literatureon negotiation theory is voluminous. Classic works include Lax and Sebenius
1986; Raiffa 1982; Ikl6 1964; Rapoport 1960; Pruitt 1981; Strauss 1978; Zartmanand Berman 1982;
and Waltonand McKersie 1965. See also Jones 1994; Kramerand Messick 1995; and Rubin and Sander
1988. On two-level games, see Putnam 1988; and Evans 1993.
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ization story presented here is essentially: how does this differ from "diplomacy
101"? Using standardnegotiation analysis, one would not be surprised to find,
among the EU permreps,regularizedpractices of mutualunderstanding,moderating demands, and generalized reciprocity, especially given the scope conditions
discussed in the next section. But according to this model, the motivations and
incentive structuresof the permrepswould be firmly rooted in the consequentialist logic of an instrumentalconception of the self and attendantinterests.Against
this default argument,I ask whether the empirical record shows an institutional
context in which not just a logic of consequences is in play, but a distinct logic of
appropriatenessas well. Can one find evidence of an expanded conception of the
self among national officials, and how would this differ from "normal"unsocialized bargainingin mixed-motive games?
To illustrate such differences, one can hypothesize four measures that would
support the appropriatenesslogic and cut against the grain of conventional bargaining and two-level games analysis wedded to a logic of consequences.
1. Noninstrumentalself-restraintin demandsand arguments.Unlike the instrumental cost-benefit logic implicit in negotiation theory, self-restraintis now
motivated by a sense of responsibility or obligation (especially to protect
what Lax and Sebenius call "process"and "relationship"interests).23Consistent with standardnegotiation theory would be evidence of EU officials
with an altered"feasibilitycalculus"24for determiningwhat strategieswork,
including when and how to make demands and to avoid being a demandeur
too often. However, self-restraintas it is used here involves a noncalculative, noninstrumentalrationale.Examples of self-restraintwould include delegations who drop demandsor reservationsafterfailing to convince the group
of an argument.Most relevant for the alternative-explanationtest is whether
one finds instances of self-restraintthat do not follow from calculative reasoning (for example, "Do I have the votes?")or, especially,self-restraintwhere
the option of veto or threat thereof exists. To the extent that one finds evidence supportingacts of self-restraintunder such conditions, this would lend
supportto the internalizednorms argument.
2. Self-enforcingadherence to informaldecision-makingnorms without threats
of external sanctioning. If standardnegotiation theories were on the mark,
one would expect to see a utilitarianconception of rule-following behavior,
supplementedby evidence of regularized cost-benefit analysis. The reason,
as Hurd explains, is because "any loyalty by actors toward the system or its
rules is contingent on the system providing a positive stream of benefits ...

23. See fn. 12 for their definition of "process"interests. "Relationship"interests are those in which
negotiators "stress the value of their relationships,"which can sometimes (under iterative bargaining)
take on "an almost transcendentstatus."Lax and Sebenius 1986, 72.
24. Kerremans1996, 232.
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actors do not value the relation itself, only the benefits accruing from it."25
If the instrumentalconception of rules fit here, one would also expect to see
reliance on institutional enforcement mechanisms and formal rules governing acceptable bargainingbehavior.26In contrast, "sustainedcompliance"27
with informal norms in the absence of external sanctions and calculative reasoning would support the argumentthat state agents negotiate from shared
understandingsof appropriatecommunity standards.28
COREPERnorms are informal and self-enforcing29because adherenceto
them is considered the "right thing to do," as part of the permreps'principled commitment to collective decision making.30The reflex to make decisions by consensus is a classic example of this and a durablepractice viewed
by the EU permreps as the "right thing to do" regardless of the formal
decision-rule. One ambassadorclaimed that the "consensus-seekingassumption ... penetrates, in my mind, everything we do."31 The mode of social
control in COREPERis compatible with Hurd's legitimacy model, in which
it is "noncompliancethat requiresof the individual special considerationand
psychic costs," and in which "the internalizationof external standardscan
... defuse Olsonian problems of collective action by causing actors to interpret the mutually cooperative option as also being the individually rational
one."32 Or as Wendt puts it, "external constraints become internal constraints, so that social control is achieved primarilythrough self-control."33
Evidence of self-enforced informalnorms without the threatof external sanctions and constraintswould supportthe noninstrumentalappropriatenesslogic.
3. Empathyand other-regardingbehavior not linked to calculative reasoning.
The alternative explanation would expect to find empathic behavior linked

25. Hurd 1999, 387.
26. For example, one would expect to see wide recourse to formal rules such as the 1994 Ioannina
Compromise, which holds that under conditions of qualified majority voting when a clear blocking
minority does not exist (but at least twenty-three to twenty-five votes oppose), the Council will still
"do all within its power" to find a "satisfactorysolution." Dinan argues that the IoanninaCompromise
was a "face-saving device" for "anti-EU" back-benchers in the British parliamentand has "had no
practicalimpact on EU decisionmaking."Dinan 1998, 299. For a similar argument-that the impact of
the infamous 1966 LuxembourgCompromiseto protect "vital nationalinterests"has been highly exaggerated and largely unimportantfor bargainingoutcomes-see Golub 1999.
27. See Checkel, this volume.
28. Although it should be added here that evidence of this measure may be compatible with either
Type I or Type II internalization.Additional tests are needed to measure the degree of "taken-forgrantedness."A useful index to operationalizethe distinction used here is the discussion in Hurd 1999
of "habitual"versus "holistic" internalization.
29. See the "Socialization Mechanisms"section below.
30. See also Gheciu, this volume, in which she codes successful socialization as cases where norms
are accepted because they are considered normal and "the right thing to do" is to comply with them;
norms are not accepted just because they are directly linked to instrumentalrewards.
31. Author's interview, 18 March 1997.
32. Hurd 1999, 388-89.
33. Wendt 1999, 361.
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to instrumentalcalculations, and in an issue-intensive, in-camerasetting such
as COREPER,this would be based on both longer time horizons (for example, "I may need help next week") and reputationalconcerns. But the internalized norms argumentexpects to see acts of empathy and other-regarding
behavior based on a different kind of calculus. The difference from the consequentialist logic is that the internalizednorms model expects such acts to
be what Wendt calls "self-binding"or "unilateralinitiatives with no expectation of specific reciprocity."34 Evidence supportingthe internalizednorms
argumentwould include examples of empathy not linked to an instrumentalist conception of interests but seen as "the right thing to do."
More specifically,evidence for Type II-internalized norms-socialization
would include those cases in which national representativesworked to convince superiorsback in the capitalsto accept anotherdelegation'splea or argument while droppingtheir own, even when veto options existed. This practice
would be coded as normative suasion because actors who are persuadedby
another's argumentthen defend the position to their authorities, seeking to
convince those authoritiesto accept the reasoningwhile at the same time dropping their own unconvincing claim. In other words, these actors are successfully persuaded to change positions, and this carries potential costs to
implement (that is, they risk the ire of the capital). Especially relevant for the
collective community standardsargumentare those cases in which the group
actively "plots" solutions to overcome domestic reserves, sometimes faking
groupoutrageor artificiallysimulatinga delegation'sisolation on a position.35
But the empathy indicator is also clearly a case in which it is misleading
to frame the question as "rationalismversus constructivism,"as both schools
offer similar predictions. Indeed, Keohane discusses several different ways
that states can interpretself-interests"empathetically,"some of which are consistent with standardbargaining (this would include other-regardingbehavior he terms "instrumentally interdependent" and "situationally
interdependent")and some of which are more akin to the internalizednorm
conception (for example, what he calls "empatheticinterdependence").36
4. Limits on instrumentalismthrough the collective legitimation of arguments.
Such acts would be especially relevant-and contrary to standardnegotiation predictions-where delegations drop demands after failing to convince
the group, despite a theoreticalrecourse to the threator use of veto under the
unanimitydecision-rule. Evidence that standardsof appropriatenessexist can
be seen in cases where group outrage is used to signal that certain things are
just not acceptable.One can furthercontextualizethe internalizednorms argument into Type I cases in which agents follow "socially expected behavior

34. Wendt 1999, 362.
35. For a discussion of "plotting" practices in COREPER, see the "Mechanisms" section below.

36. Keohane 1984, 120-25.

Socialization and Decision Making in the EuropeanUnion 945

in a given setting or community"and Type II cases of accepting community
norms as "the right thing to do,"37 a point returnedto in the fourth section,
below. But in general, both variantsdeviate from the alternativeexplanation
of standardnegotiationby their noninstrumental,noncalculativemotivations.

The Pathway of Socialization in COREPER
COREPERis "responsiblefor preparingthe work of the Council and for carrying
out the tasks assigned to it by the Council."38 From this austere legal basis,
COREPERhas evolved into a majorplayer in the EU system. Among its "assigned
tasks" is the remit to "coordinatethe work of the various Council meetings and to
endeavourto reachagreementat its level."39In essence, this means thatCOREPER
holds responsibilityfor the performanceof the Council as a whole. Permrepsclaim
that this responsibilityis an implicit partof the job description.As one ambassador
put it, "thereis a high collective interest in getting results and reaching solutions.
This is in additionto representingthe nationalinterest."40Anotherclaimed to have
an unwritten,global, permanentinstructionto "findsolutions."41 Whateverthe case
and as these quotes suggest, logics of appropriatebehaviorand socializationdynamics seem evident within COREPER.The analyticchallenge is to establishtheirscope
conditions and mechanisms of operation,tasks to which I now turn.
Scope Conditions
Issue density/intensity. COREPER'sstructuralplacement imparts a coherence
and continuity in the representationof interests that would otherwise be difficult
to match. In terms of structurallocation, COREPER occupies a unique institutional vantage point in the EU system. Vertically placed between the experts and
the ministers and horizontally situated with cross-sectoral policy responsibilities,
the permrepshave a generaloverview of the Council's work. Relative to the experts
meeting in the working groups, they are political heavyweights; but compared to
the ministers, they are both policy generalists and experts in the substantivequestions of a file.
Since the Council's work is based on a concept of sectoral differentiation,pursuing the "nationalinterest" across its sixteen or so formations requires national
systems of interest intermediationand interministerialcoordinationthat are complex even for the smallest member states or those with the most centralized EU

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Checkel, this volume.
Art. 207, Treaty on EuropeanUnion.
Council of the EuropeanUnion 1997, 39.
Author's interview, 12 July 1996.
Author's interview, 20 February1996.
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affairs machinery. It is here that the permreps in COREPER, with their crossCouncil negotiating mandatesand intersectoralpolicy responsibilities, practice an
essential aggregationfunction. A central featureof COREPER'sinstitutionalenvironment is the density of issues and issue-areas that are covered in the agendas of
the weekly meetings. No other site of everyday EU decision making approximates
the intensity of weekly COREPERnegotiations (measuredin terms of the number
of weekly agenda items and the horizontalnatureof these agendas).Thus the agendas of COREPERmeetings are qualitativelydifferentthan the type encounteredat
the Council working group level. Unlike the "contactthesis" then, which equates
socialization with the amount of interaction,42the patterndiscerned here is contingent on the density and quality of interactions.
Not only is COREPER distinguished by the intensity of negotiations, but the
permreps'involvement across the different domains of EU decision making is pervasive as well. In addition to the regular cycle of weekly meetings, the permreps
sit beside their ministers during Council sessions, briefing them and offering tactical suggestions. Permreps attend European Council summits and can serve as
behind-the-scenesconsultants.The growth of codecision (now consideredthe EU's
"ordinary"legislative procedure) has also created an intense negotiation forum
between members of the EuropeanParliament(MEPs) and the deputy permreps
who representthe Council.43
Reinforcing the intensity of interactions, the EU permreps also accumulate
a great deal of experience through long periods of participation.44The average
tenure is five years, slightly longer than the typical three- or four-year diplomatic rotation.45 But some permreps remain in Brussels for much longer,
upwards of a decade or beyond. Another reinforcement mechanism is the
COREPER luncheon, held by COREPER II before the monthly General Affairs
Council (GAC) and sometimes on a more topical, ad hoc basis. Lunches are frequently used to tackle the thorniest of problems, since attendance is heavily
restricted, no notes are taken, and not even translatorsare present.46There are
also informal COREPERtrips, hosted by the presidency, that precede European
Council summits.
In sum, the first scope condition is COREPER'sunique structuralposition in
everyday EU decision making, with a brand of intensity that is generated by the
density and scope of agendas and widespreadparticipationin nearly all aspects of
the Council's work;this is reinforcedby extensive periodsof interactionand numerous informal venues for negotiation. This scope condition can also be restated in
hypothesis form:

42. See Checkel,this volume.
43. Bostock2002.
44. See Checkel,this volume,for a discussionof the methodological
problemsin conflatingthe
intensityanddurationof interaction.
45. Lewis 1998, 111-13.

46. Butler1986,30.
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HI: The internalizationof new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line
with group-communitynorms is more likely when individualsare in settings where
contact is intense and sustained.
Insulation. One of the centralfeaturesof COREPERdiplomacyis a high degree
of insulationfrom the normalcurrentsof domestic constituentpressures.The meetings themselves are treated with an air of confidentiality, and many sensitive
national positions are ironed out in restrictedsessions in which the permrepsclear
the room and can speak frankly and in confidence that what is said will not be
reported to the capitals or the media. This often includes group discussion on
how an agreement will be packaged and sold to the authorities back home.
"At our level, publicity does not exist," an ambassador explained, "Our body
is absolutely black; we can do deals.""47The norms of insulation are so developed that national experts from the capitals are not allowed to attend COREPER
meetings at all (one official referred to them as "spies," another called them
"the watchdogs" who "are not allowed in the room").48The role of insulation
in COREPER diplomacy supports Checkel's hypothesis49 that persuasion and
socialization are more likely in "less politicized and more insulated, in-camera
settings."
A structuralfeature of COREPER that often goes unnoticed is that insulation
affords member states the capacity to reshape domestic constraints.As an ambassador put it, "COREPERis the only forum in the EU where representativesdon't
have a domestic turf to defend." Because of this, he went on to add, "it is often
politically necessary to present a position knowing it is unrealistic.My minister of
finance needs certain argumentsto be presented.He has certain pressuresfrom his
constituencies. We have to make it look like we fought for this even though we
both know it will lead nowhere. I will present it, and if it receives no support, I
will drop it."50 Along with insulation comes a high degree of input ("voice") in
the instruction process, including how arguments/interests are articulated and
defended.The degree of voice thatthe permrepscan obtainstems from COREPER's
basic mission to find solutions and keep the work of the Council moving forward.
One intriguing argumentas to why states would choose to create such a highly
insulatedbody comes from recentworkby Stasavage.Using a rationalchoice framework, he shows how "open-door bargaining"and greater levels of transparency
can increase "posturing"by negotiators, since they have built-in incentives to
present unyielding positions "in orderto demonstrateto their constituentsthat they
are effective or committed bargainers."51

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Author's interview, 23 May 2000.
Author's interviews, 23 May 2000; and 18 April 1997.
See Checkel, this volume.
Author's interview, 15 May 2000.
Stasavage 2004, 673.
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Domestic insulation has enabled the permreps to develop de facto decisionmaking capabilities.52The best empirical indicator of the weight of COREPER's
decision-making role is the prolific "A-point" procedure. A-points are "agreed
points" (that is, issues agreed to within COREPER) that are passed en bloc and
without discussion by the ministers at the beginning of each Council session.53
Even for files markedas B-points (that is, issues sent to the ministers that require
furtherdiscussion), the input of COREPERshould not be ruled out. In many cases,
detailed negotiations have already taken place in COREPER (see the case study
below for an example). It is remarkable,in fact, that COREPER'sburgeoning de
facto decision-making power has escaped every post-Maastricht"democraticdeficit" revision unscathed, entirely on the ratherthin reed that only ministers have
juridical decisional authority.
To summarize, the second scope condition for COREPER socialization is
insulated-from both domestic constituencies and domestic line ministriesnegotiation,coupled with de facto (as opposed to juridical)decision-makingauthority. This can be restated as follows:
H2: The internalizationof new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line
with group-communitynorms is more likely when individuals are in private, incamera settings with a high degree of domestic insulation.
Having identified the key conditions under which to expect socialization, I turn
now to the major factors that explain how this process occurs and how it can lead
to sharedunderstandingsof appropriateness-understandings that produce behaviors different from those based on instrumentaland utilitariancalculations alone.54
Socialization Mechanisms
Strategic Calculation and Role Playing: Adherence to Informal Norms. A
distinctive featureof COREPER'sinstitutionalenvironmentis a robust set of durable yet unwritten and purely informal decision-making norms. One of the most
striking aspects of these informal norms is their seemingly "self-binding"nature
(Wendt's term). Why do national representatives comply? The interview data
strongly suggests that COREPERparticipantspractice pro-normbehavior (in the
absence of external sanctioning) because it leads to the acquisition of social influence and diffuse, intangible "social capital."5 As a mechanism of socialization,
52. The permanentrepresentativeshave no formal decision-making authority.Juridical decisionmaking authority is a power exclusively reserved for the ministers, and formal voting is expressly
prohibited at any other level of the Council (compareArt. 7[1] of the Council's Rules of Procedure).
53. Recent studies of the Council have documented the growth and importanceof the A-point procedure in the EU legislative process. See, for example, van Schendelen 1996; and Gomez and Peterson
2001.
54. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this language.
55. For a discussion of "social capital," see Putnam 1993, 169-70.
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behaviorial adaptationto acquire social influence is what this volume would code
as strategic calculation.56
The explanation does not end there, however. To get what you want in
COREPER, you must also subscribe to socially accepted standardsof behavior.
Evidence of this patternwould support what this volume calls Type I internalization or role-playing socialization. These informal norms act as cognitive markers
for newcomers to adapt to the group's accepted standards.As I will show below
in the case of Austria's "opt-out"argument,the group can reject argumentswith
exaggeratedferocity to shame capitals and pressurea change in nationaldemands.
Group outrage is used to signal that certain behavior andjustificationfor demands
is simply not done or is not acceptable.
Five informal norms stand out. First, there is a norm of diffuse reciprocity, or
the diffuse balancing of concessions over an extended shadow of the future.57Diffuse reciprocity can take many forms, including'concessions and derogations, or
"going out on a limb" to persuadethe capital for changes or a compromise. Dropping reserves or abstaining (rather than voting "no") are also political gestures
that can be filed away and later returnedin kind.
Second, there is a norm of thick trust and the ability to speak frankly, which is
reinforced by weekly meetings, trips, and lunches. Thick trustis especially important duringendgame negotiations or restrictedsessions when the "realknives come
out on the table.""8Third, there is a norm of mutual responsiveness that is best
described as a sharedpurpose to understandeach other's problems. Knowing and
understandingeach other's interests and argumentsis a key to "receiving understanding from the group."59Mutual responsiveness is a form of collective legitimation, wherein arguments or pleas for special consideration are collectively
accepted or rejected by the group. The fourth norm is a consensus-reflex. This is
what Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace refer to as "the instinctive recourse to behave
consensually."60Although systematic empiricaldata is lacking because of the confidentialityof negotiations, participantsclaim that the overwhelming bulk of decisions are made consensually. Even under conditions of qualified majority voting
(QMV), permrepsoften spend extra time to "bringeveryone on board."Pushing
for a vote is considered inappropriatein most cases, and the "consensus assumption" is a reflexive habit.61
Finally, there is a culture of compromise premised on a basic willingness to
accommodate divergent interests and reinforced by the other norms listed above.
This culture is facilitated by the "dynamicdensity" of COREPER'swork and the

56. See Checkel, this volume.

57. See Keohane1986for the classictreatiseon "diffusereciprocity."
58. Author's interview, 14 March 1996. On the concept of thick trust, see Putnam 1993, 167-71.
59. Author's interview, 17 February 1997.

60. Hayes-Renshaw
andWallace1995,465.
61. Author'sinterview,18 March1997.
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horizontal natureof agendas. The normativeeffects of this culture include a selfrestraintin the calculations and defense of interests, seen for example when delegations quietly dropreservesafterfailing to convince the othersof theirarguments.
Taken together, these informal norms are widely practiced and firmly institutionalized in COREPER'sorganizationalculture.62As the case study of local elections negotiations will show, adherence to these norms cannot be explained by
eithera pureincentive-based(consequentialist)or normative(appropriateness)logic,
but instead representsa subtle blending of the two. That is, pro-normbehavior is
rooted in a complex combination of both strategic calculation and role-playing
socialization. Which came first, and how these normative scripts became institutionalized into COREPERroutines, remains largely to be told.
Normative suasion. COREPERhas its own locution, with signals, key phrases,
and unspoken meaning. There is also a certain element of theatricality,in manufacturing intrigue; how else could one sit through yet another round of fishing
quotas, as one permrep alluded. All of this is the typical grammarof diplomats,
to be expected in issue-intensive, insulated settings where negotiators develop
long-term interpersonalrelationships.Going furtherthough, one also sees a wide
range of discursive resources that permreps can use in presenting and collectively legitimating arguments.This real possibility for normative suasion is what
separates COREPERfrom the alternative argumentof "normal"interstate negotiation. For example, as the local election case study will show, COREPER is
considered the EU's locus classicus for "opt-out" negotiations, since permreps
use collective legitimationto determinewho warrantsspecial considerationbacked
by standardsof fairness where persuasivejustifications carry the day (ratherthan
relativepower, voting weights, or the decision-rule).Evidence of this patternwould
tend to support Checkel's hypothesis63 that socialization is more likely where
agents do not "lecture or demand"but ratheract on "principles of serious deliberative argument."
Learningthe derogationdiscourse is an importanttool of the tradein COREPER,
and senior permrepsdevelop idiosyncratic methods for signaling when they need
special dispensations. For many, this includes having a sense of humor when isolated or when national political sensitivities are being discussed. Normative
suasion is an important socialization mechanism in COREPER, and unlike the
mechanism of strategic calculation, it is sustainedover time without respect to the
structureof incentives or the existence of external sanctions. But argumentative
resources are intertwinedby consequentialist and appropriatenesslogics, and it is
often difficult to tease the two motivations apart.
Put differently, in COREPER,argumentsmatter.While a truism in almost any
type of negotiation, there are no comparable sites within the Council where the

62. See Noel 1967; and Lewis 2003.
63. See Checkel, this volume.
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persuasive power of one's argumentsweighs on outcomes.64Representativesclaim
that they come preparedto convince and be convinced by others, and many of the
weekly meetings are geared towardreaching a "reasonedconsensus" ratherthan a
vote.65Arguing and persuasionare also seen in how the permrepssignal that something is particularly important or request mutual understandingfrom the group
(irrespective of the formal decision-rule).
Participantsclaim that even in rare instances when they do vote, it is exceptional that this is done without the consent of the "no's.",66 In COREPER, the
power of a good argument can be as compelling as a blocking minority or the
shadow of the veto. The possibility of persuadingothers with a convincing argument and the norms of mutual responsiveness work as a great equalizer in
COREPERnegotiations. As a result, smaller member states who articulate sound
arguments and/or clearly explain their positions can often punch above their
weight. According to one participant,"If you convince others, it's with good arguments. Big or small makes no difference. In fact, the big member states often
have higher burdens of proof in order to convince the
others."'67
Another example of normative suasion is how permrepsengage in the collective "plotting"of agreements.68Plotting is a negotiation patternin COREPERthat
demonstrateshow a collective rationalitycan reformulateindividual, instrumental
rationality.The basic function of plotting is using the group to redefine a national
position or to reshape domestic constraints.69"To get new instructionswe have to
show [the capital] we have a black eye," an ambassadorexplained, "We can ask
COREPERfor help with this; it is one of our standardpractices."70According to
another,"SometimesI will deal with impossible instructionsby saying, 'Mr.Chairman, can I report back the fierce opposition to this by the fourteen others?' And
sometimes fierceness is exaggerated for effect."71 Exaggeratingthe fierceness of
opposition is thus a group strategy to collectively legitimate or reject arguments.
A clear illustration of this practice is seen below in the way the group handles
Austria's claim for special treatment.
In general,as standardnegotiationtheoryexplains,plottingand underliningopposition are tools of the trade to deal with recalcitrantbargainingpositions. But in

64. But see Puetter's 2003 analysis of the EurogroupCouncil as a deliberative process based on a
"sharednormativeframework."
65. Although it is important to emphasize here that EU permreps, without exception, stress the
importance of the decision-rule in contextualizing negotiations. It is a cliche in COREPERthat qualified majorityvoting is the surest way to reach consensus.
66. Author's interviews, 15 May 2000; and 12 July 1996.
67. Author's interview, 29 May 2000. Based on survey data of 218 national officials in the EU,
Egeberg, Schaefer, and Trondalfind that influence on committees is considerably higher among those
with demonstrableexpertise than those from big states per se. Egeberg, Schaefer, and Trondal 2003,
28, tab. 11.
68. See Lewis 2002, 292, for an example.
69. Two-level games researcherscall this "COG collusion." Evans 1993, 406-7.
70. Author's interview, 15 May 2000.
71. Author's interview, 26 May 2000.
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COREPER,this takes on an additionallayer of collective legitimation as a framework of sharedmeaning within the standardsof appropriateness.As Risse argues,
in a "collectivecommunicativeprocess"actorsare engaged in determining"whether
norms of appropriatebehaviorcan be justified, and which norms apply undergiven
circumstances."72This is a hallmarkof COREPER'srole in the EU system, and
viewed from the process level of everyday decision making, the stamp of collectively negotiated standardsof appropriatenessis unmistakable.In the case of local
elections (see below), this can be seen in how the permrepsdeliberate derogation
requestsagainsta principledcommitmentfor maximalinterpretationof "equaltreatment" standardsin EU voting rights.

Methods and Data
My research design follows a methodological strategy of "empirical triangulation" combining several qualitative and quantitativedata sources: semi-structured
interviews, archival documentation(Council documents such as the travauxpreparatoires, press releases, agendas, and so on), and secondary sources. My primary data sources are semi-structuredinterviews with COREPERparticipants.To
date, I have conducted 118 interviews at the permanentrepresentationsand with
regularCOREPERparticipantsfrom the Commissionand the Council GeneralSecretariat(CGS).73Interviewingtook place in four roundsover a seven-yearperiod.74
Controllingfor Prior Exposure and Self-Selection
Three methods were used to limit potential measurementproblems, such as prior
exposure to EU decision making. First, interview subjects were asked direct questions about their initial participationin COREPERnegotiations, how they articulated their written instructions, and what, if any, changes occurred over time.
Second, the interviews sampled "newcomers" at two levels: individual participants and new member states (both Nordic and Central/Eastern Europeannewcomers are included in the sample). Third, I was able to re-interview some
participantsat a later date and compare their responses.
Several generalizable patterns emerged. The interviews track similar learning
curves for newcomers, even those with different backgroundsand from different
national administrativecultures. Participantstypically claim that when they began
attending the Committee, they learned that defending instructions alone had lim-

72. Risse 2000, 7.
73. The sample includes: thirty-one permanentrepresentatives(eighteen ambassadorsand thirteen
deputies), thirty-twotop advisorsto the permreps(known as the "Antici"[COREPERII] and "Mertens"
[COREPERI] counselors), thirty policy specialists, nine legal advisors, ten officials in national capitals, and six others.
74. Specifically, February-July 1996, February-April 1997, May 2000, and May-June 2003.
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ited effectiveness.75This involves more than learningjust strategy;effectiveness,
accordingto participants,includes developing a sense of self-restraintand the ability to balance the specific instructions on a single file with more global instructions to keep the work of the Council moving forward.
Another pattern is that newcomers initially tend to view their counterpartsas
rivals. "I saw my colleagues as opponents at first," one deputy commented.76
Anotherclaimed, "Earlyin our membershipwe acted tough and we had these positions, 'Othersdon't like it, too bad.' But the politicians back home learned fast to
be preparedto compromise. Now we are known as a country others can turnto for
a compromise."77 On balance, the evidence suggests that newcomers have relatively high levels of ingrainedcognitive priors, which supportsCheckel's hypothesis78 that under such conditions there will be greater resistance to normative
suasion. The COREPERnovice who "treatscolleagues as opponents"undergoes a
period of social learning (and mimicry) during which they adopt new cognitive
templatesin orderto operatein an unfamiliarenvironment.Some newcomersrecall
receiving extra patience and understandingfrom the group;a permrepfrom one of
the newer EU member states commented, "They [COREPER]gave [us] and the
new member states special patience, but now I think that's over."79
In summary,while no guaranteeagainst potential measurementbias, the built-in
controls of triangulation,newcomer sampling, and re-interviewing help to minimize such effects. More importantly,they strengthenthe case for the independent
causal influence of socialization dynamics within COREPER.To directly test the
four socialization measures spelled out in section two, the argumentnow shifts to
an examinationof the 1994 local elections directive, a controversialand politically
unpopularextension of voting and participatoryrights for EU citizens. With this
directive, for the first time, the EU allowed citizens from any memberstate to vote
and runfor office in municipalelections based on whereverthey residedin the EU.80

Socialization in COREPER: The Case of the 1994
Local Elections Directive
The EU foreign affairs ministers, meeting in the GAC, adopted a directive on
the right to vote and run for municipal elections on 19 December 1994.81 The
75. One common response was that following written instructions alone (that is, just reading from
them) was a sure way to be left out of the discussion.
76. Author's interview, 17 March 1996.
77. Author's interview, 14 March 1996.
78. See Checkel, this volume.
79. Author's interview, 14 March 1996.
80. Numerically,the directive enfranchisedapproximately5.3 million EU citizens living in another
EU-15 member state. Lewis 1998, tab. 5-2, 215.
81. Council Directive 94/80/EC. The full title is the directive "[L]aying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidatein municipal elections by citizens
of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals."Official JournalL 368/38,
31 December 1994.
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substance of this directive had already been agreed upon twelve days earlier in
COREPER.Negotiations were intentionally kept out of the GAC and the ambassadors were encouraged to reach an agreement in COREPERthat could then be
formally rubber-stampedby the ministers.
The local elections directive covered sensitive domestic political issues of electoral and citizenship laws, requiringthe majorityof member states to pass constitutional amendmentsto extend rights to "nonnational"EU citizens. The directive
effectively established a principle of equal treatmentbetween national and nonnational EU citizens. Moreover, the principle of equal treatmentwas agreed upon at
a level of maximumcoverage,with a minimalistinterpretationof acceptablenational
"opt-outs."The principle of equal treatmentagreed to in COREPEReven went
beyond earlierCommission proposals that considered minimumresidency requirements a prerequisitefor expanding local voting rights to Community nationals.82
During negotiations, several delegations (including Denmark,France,the Netherlands,and Sweden) initially voiced preferencesfor maintainingresidencyrequirements that already existed in national law (see Table 1). However, the final terms
of the directive allowed minimum residency rules in Luxembourg and, on an
extremely limited basis, in Belgium. It was a sharedunderstandingamong the EU
permrepsthat"opt-outs"would have to meet high standardsfor justificationbecause
of the potential for derogations to water down the scope and application of local
voting rights. From the earliest discussions in COREPER,there was an informal
and sometimes shifting majority of members who defended the need for equal
treatmentbetween nationaland nonnationalEU citizens. Counterfactually,the argument presentedhere is that minus socialization, the final outcome would have been
very different-if agreementwould have been reached at all.
Explaining the Local Elections Negotiations: Testingthe
Alternative Explanation
This article contends that everyday EU decision making is not all about relative
power, formal decision-rules, and instrumentalinterest calculations. If it were, the
alternative argumentis that bargaining behavior and everyday outcomes can be
explained with standardnegotiation theory and two-level games analysis. However, if the alternative explanation was correct, one would expect to see a very
different sequence of bargainingbehavior leading to a different kind of outcome
than what occurred in this case. First, although at least four delegations (Denmark, France, Greece, and Austria) were interestedin derogations and could have
credibly linked such claims to the "shadowof the veto", none did. Moreover, after

82. The Commission's position was for minimum residence at least equal to the term of local
office to vote, and double the term of office in order to stand for election. European Communities
Bulletin 9-1986, 44. In effect, this would apply the Luxembourgderogation (see discussion below) to
the entire EU.
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TABLE1. National legislation governing municipal elections
Existing national legislation before the 1994
local elections directive

Member state

Basis for electoral rights

Ireland

Residence

All nonnational residents eighteen years and older,
who have lived in Ireland for at least six months can
vote and run for office in local elections (1973 Electoral Act, right to vote; 1974 Electoral Act, right to run
for office).

Denmark

Residence

Since 1977, the right to vote and run for local office
has been extended to nationals of the Nordic Union
(Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Norway) who are eighteen
years or older and have met minimum residency
requirements(Law of 18 May 1977).
In 1981, these rights were extended to all nonnationals
(Law No. 143 of 30 March 1981 Amending the Law
Governing Municipal Elections and by Decree of the
Minister of the InteriorNo. 196 of 22 April 1981).

Netherlands

Residence

In 1983, Article 130 of the Constitution was amended
to allow all nonnationalsthe right to vote and run for
office in local elections, subject to a minimum residency requirements.

Britain

Residence and nationality

The right to vote and run for office in local elections is
extended to Irish nationals and Commonwealth citizens who are over the age of eighteen (to vote) or
twenty-one (to stand as candidate) and have met minimum residency requirements.

Spain

Nationality

Since 1985, the right to vote in local elections (but not
to stand as a candidate)can be extended to nonnational
residents by treaty or law on a reciprocalbasis (Article
3 of the General Electoral Law of 19 July 1985).

Portugal

Nationality

Since 1982, nationals of a Portuguese-speakingcountry may be given the right to vote in local elections by
treaty or by law on a reciprocal basis. Only one such
agreement was reached, with Brazil, extending the
right for Brazilian nationals to vote in local Portuguese
elections after having lived in Portugal for five years.

Finland

Nationality

Since 1977, the right to vote and run for local office
has been extended to nationals of the Nordic Union
(Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Norway) who are eighteen years or older, and have met minimum residency
requirements.

Sweden

Nationality

Since 1977, the right to vote and run for local office
has been extended to nationals of the Nordic Union
(Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway) who are eighteen years or older, and have met minimum residency
requirements.

France

Nationality

The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for French nationals (Article 3).
(continued)
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TABLE 1. (CONTINUED)

Member state

Basis for electoral rights

Germany

Nationality

Italy

Nationality

Belgium

Nationality

Luxembourg

Nationality

Greece

Nationality

Austria

Nationality

Existing national legislation before the 1994
local elections directive
The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for German nationals (Article 20 and
28[1] of the Basic Law).
The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for Italian nationals (Articles 48 and 51).
The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for Belgian nationals (Article 4).
The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for Luxembourg nationals (Articles 52
and 107).
The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for Greek nationals (Article 51).
The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally reserved for Austrian nationals.

failing to convince the group on the merits of their special circumstances, each
reconsidered or dropped their demands. In the counterfactual "diplomacy 101"
scenario, COREPERsans socialization, this behavior would remain anomalous.
Second, the alternative explanation would not hypothesize a maximalist interpretation of Article 8(b) establishing the principle of equal treatment between
national and nonnational EU citizens in municipal elections. Given the sensitive
domestic political issues concerning electoral and citizenship laws,83 as well as
the unanimitydecision-rulethatappliedhere, one would expect a much wider acceptance of nationalderogationand exemptionclaims thanresulted.In short,the "diplomacy 101" model would predict a tendency toward a least-common-denominator
applicationof Article 8(b). But as I will show, explaining the bargainingbehavior
of the EU permreps as well as the (maximalist) outcome is not possible without
reference to how standardsof appropriatenessand group-communitynorms to collectively legitimate argumentsare an internalizedpart of COREPER'scollective
culture.

83. In fact, Eurobarometerdata from this era show no issue-area where EU citizens opposed EU
action more. Eurobarometer,No. 39, EC, DG X, 1993. Cited in Eurostat 1996, 241. For example:
Common foreign policy toward countries outside the EU
A single currency should replace all the national currencies in the EU by
1999
Each citizen of a countryin the EU should have the right to vote in the municipal elections of the country in which he/she is resident

%for
66
52

% against
19
38

48

41
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Relevance of Scope Conditions
The local elections case provides solid evidence for how scope conditions play a
role in promoting socialization. The intensity dimension is seen in the complex
linkages between local elections and the larger political stakes of implementing
the necessary secondary legislation of the Maastricht Treaty on time. Specifically, the treaty set a 31 December 1994 deadline to reach agreement on the
detailed implementationrules for local voting rights. There was a general perception of responsibility among the permreps to reach agreement on a
directive that would become a key substantive component of the fledgling EU
citizenship chapter agreed to at Maastricht. This sense of responsibility comes
out clearly in content analysis of interviews with participants,who claimed there
was a sharedbelief that if it was sent to the ministers they would either not reach
agreement at all or would be unable to "contain"discussions for derogations. A
protractedstalemate on local elections, a heated debate among the foreign ministers, or a substantively watered-downdirective in the scope and terms of application were all scenariosthat the EU permrepscollectively wanted to avert. Within
this context, negotiations were both intense and sustained, supporting Hypothesis 1 (that internalized group-communitystandardsare more likely under such
conditions).
The local elections case also illustrates the importance of the second background condition: insulation. In this instance, many of the permreps were
instructed by their capital to keep negotiations at their level and avoid the
GAC. One official claimed his ambassador's instructions clearly signaled the
need to "keep it away from the press, where it would have been politicized
Another explained, "We all knew that if the discussion was put
quickly."'84
a certain way we never would reach agreement. Because of the press, pressure
from national populations, the idea that 'We will be run by foreigners.'"'85
This supports Stasavage's findings that insulated negotiations are a strategically rational institutional design where the risks of posturing run high.86
The high degree of insulation manufacturedto help COREPER "find solutions"
also clearly supports Hypothesis 2 (that internalizednorms are more likely under
such conditions). Indeed, insulation proved critical to the process of normative
suasion, seen below in the use of "restricted"sessions to sort out whose pleas
for special consideration warranted attention. The restricted ambassadors-only
setting provided a degree of insulation for principled debate and deliberative
argumentationthat other Council bodies, especially the GAC, simply did not
possess.

84. Author's interview, 10 May 1996.
85. Author's interview, 18 April 1997.
86. Stasavage 2004.
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Negotiating Derogations: Collective Legitimationand the
Principle of Equal Treatment
The most critical stage of negotiations centeredon who would receive derogations
from the scope and application of the directive. The entire agreement hinged on
this issue, because it would define how extensive coverage was and whether the
principle of equal treatmentwould be interpretedin a maximal or minimal sense.
When the ambassadorsbegan derogation discussions in the fall of 1994, nearly
half were under instruction to seek special consideration, although the presentation of these "special problems" would only be played out over the next seven
weeks. In particular,six member states would claim serious domestic political difficulties:Luxembourg,Denmark,France,Greece,Austria,and Belgium. See Table2.
Luxembourgreceived the earliest supportfor a derogation,and discussion reiterated why this was justified, given the high proportionof nonnationalCommunity
residents-nearly 30 percent of the total electorate.87There was also the precedent of the 1993 directive on the right to vote in EuropeanParliamentelections,
where Luxembourg was allowed to set minimum residency requirementsof five
years for nonnationalEU voters and ten years for candidates.88The agreed wording of the derogation covers a member state where nonnationalEU citizens form
more than 20 percent of the total electorate, effectively limiting the exemption to
Luxembourg(thatis, the 20-percentthresholdis not applicableto individualmunicipalities within member states). But the Luxembourgexception did create a precedent that other delegations would try to extend to their own "special" problems
in justifying a case for national derogations.
Denmark,for example, already allowed all foreign nationals the right to vote in
local elections after a minimum residency of three years. They therefore wanted
to extend this residency requirementto nonnationalEU citizens as a special clause
to the directive. But few supporteda fixed residency requirement,under the logic
that Danish nationals were not subject to the same restriction and, it was argued,
this would violate the principle of equal treatmentbetween national and nonnational EU citizens.89
Groupdiscussion led to a consensus that equal treatmentshould not be enforced
by sliding scale, whereasjustificationin the case of Luxembourgcould be extended
by varying degrees to other domestic contexts.90This argumentcarriedconsiderable persuasive power, and there is no evidence that Denmark put up much of a
struggle after failing to sell their case in COREPER.The Danish ambassadorkept

87. In the other member states, the average proportion of nonnational EU residents to nationals
varied from 0.1 percent (Finland) to 6 percent (Belgium) of the electorate. See Lewis 1998, tab. 5-3,
222.
88. Council Directive 93/109/EC. Official JournalL 329/34, 30 December 1993. Following adoption of the EP voting directive, a number of researcherspredicted the local elections directive would
be more controversial. See, for example, Koslowski 1994, 389; and Oliver 1996, 475, 489.
89. Author's interview, 21 May 1996.
90. Author's interviews, 21 May 1996; 18 April 1997; and 18 May 2000.
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TABLE
2. Derogation argumentsfor the 1994 local elections directive
Persuasive
argument?

Collectively legitimated
outcome

Member state

Nature of the problem

Luxembourg

30 percent of electorate are nonnational EU citizens.

Yes

Article 12(1). May establish
minimum residency requirements for nonnationalEU citizens, not to exceed the term
length of the local office in
question (to vote) and twice
the term length to stand as candidate.

Denmark

All foreign nationals can vote in
local elections after meeting a
residency requirement of three
years; Community nationals
should still be required to meet
this requirement.
Certain local offices participate
in the College des grands dlecteurs senatoriaux and have powers to elect delegates to the parliamentaryassembly.
In municipalities where more
than 20 percent of voters are
nonnationalEU citizens, only 20
percent of the seats in the local
assembly should be held by such
nationals.

No

Danish nationals are not subject to this requirement;would
violate the principle of equal
treatmentbetween all EU citizens.

Yes

Article 5(4). Allows additional
restrictions on local offices
designating delegates who
vote in or elect members to the
parliamentaryassembly.
Violates the principle of equal
treatment, and the restriction
of posts to own nationals in
Article 5(3).

Greece

Desired extension of the Luxembourg derogation to the local
level.

No

Exemptions should be as
restricted as possible and are
not applicable to local government units; the Luxembourg
derogation applies to the
national level.

Austria

Desired extension of the Luxembourg derogation to the local
level.

No

Exemptions should be
restrictedas possible.

Belgium

Territorialdivision of electorate
into linguistic communities.

Yes

Article 12(2). May restrict
application of directive to certain communes, a list of which
must be published one year
before elections are held.

France

No

as

the reservation on the table until the 7 December session of COREPER, neither
removing the requestfor a residency requirementnor pushing very hardfor amendment. Unable to convince others, the Danish delegation droppedtheir reserve and
accepted the directive as it stood. Standardbargainingtheory would have expected
something different here, either a tacit or explicit linkage to the "shadow of the
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veto," or at minimum, a more visible cost-benefit analysis weighing an agreement
with no residency requirementsagainst the political difficulty of reformingnational
electoral and citizenship legislation. "Diplomacy 101" would also expect to find
an active campaign by Denmarkto support other delegations with similar preferences (especially France, Belgium, and possibly Greece and Austria).
France requested a derogation because of special problems in municipalities
where mayors had authority to elect Senate delegates. Specifically, the French
wished to exclude municipal offices with independentpowers in Senate elections
from the scope of the directive. Based on this argument, they received support
and understandingin COREPER.The group's rationale for accepting the derogation was that Article 8b(1) of the MaastrichtTreaty clearly delimits the scope of
voting and participatoryrights to the municipal level.
In addition, the French made a second special request to restrict the directive's
scope by limiting the number of local seats open to nonnational EU citizens in
specific municipalities. In October, under pressure from Paris and the political
signals being sent from the Senate, the French ambassadorwas instructedto argue
for a clause limiting the numberof seats open to other member states' citizens to
20 percent in municipalities where more than 20 percent of the electorate were
nonnational EU citizens.91 The new French proposal suggested the following
restriction:
In the basic local government units where the number of voters within the
scope of Article 3 representsmore than 20% of national voters, the Member
State of residence may limit to this proportionthe number of elected representatives who are nationals of other Member States authorizedto sit in the
assemblies of such local authorities.92
In practical terms, this would have extended the Luxembourg derogation to the
local level. Greece showed early support for the idea, but the German, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, and British delegations placed the "gravest reservations"
on the proposal as a violation of the principle of equal treatment.93 In the course
of discussing the "quotasystem"at several differentmeetings, a majorityof ambassadors spoke in support of rejecting this argument, while others, including the
Frenchambassador,remainedsilent. The ambassadorswho found the Frenchrequest
unconvincing arguedthat the derogation would result in a patchy implementation
of the directive and renderthe Treaty'sobjective of endowing EU citizenship with
distinct rights a hollow shell. The French ambassador,under instruction,kept this
reservation in place right up until the end, when it was dropped after the lunch
session of COREPERon 7 December.94

91. Author's interview, 10 March 1997.

92. Council Document 8810/94, 7 September 1994, 8.
93. Author's interviews, 4 and 18 March 1997.
94. See discussion below.
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Why the French would drop this reserve requires a two-part explanation, of
which neitherpart fits the standardnegotiation story. First, the French ambassador
became convinced that a maximal interpretationof equal treatmentwas essential
and the quota system was incompatible with this concept.95Second and more tellingly, the French ambassadorthen went "out on a limb" to convince foreign ministry superiors (who were well aware of the bellwether position of the Senate on
nonnationalcitizenshiprights)thatthe quotaargumentwas unconvincingand lacked
justification.96Going one step further, below I track how the change in French
position and quiet removal of the quota proposal, coupled with acceptance of others' derogation claims, shows a clear instance of Type II normative suasion.
Greece and Austria both experienced difficulties generating understandingfor
their special problems. Both arguments were rejected in COREPER, and each
shows a dynamic of collective legitimation that the alternativeexplanation would
miss because of the irreducible quality of communicative rationality involved.
Nor can standardnegotiation theory explain why the rejectees made no recourse
to the "shadow of the veto." One rejection came informally and was essentially
unspoken, while the other requireda more dramatictechnique. Raised initially at
the working-grouplevel and during informal bilateral talks, the Greek delegation
voiced what one group member described as "theirhypotheticalconcern that they
could have the future obligation to give Turkishcitizens the right to vote" should
Turkeyever become an EU member state.97But Greece never came out and made
an argumentfor a derogation at the group level in COREPER.The Greeks, perhaps aware that their argument lacked persuasive power, quietly dropped their
reserve.
A similar hypothetical concern was raised by Austria, but this time the group
relied on a more explicit rejection from the presidency, then held by Germany,to
delegitimize and even "shame"Austria's claim for special understanding."They
were afraid of how the directive would be accepted internally,"a group representative recalled, "They are afraid of extreme Right movements and they have a
high standardof living, so it was not easy to explain to them the advantageof the
directive."98The Austrian ambassadorpressed for a special derogation twice at
the level of COREPER.The first time, no one said anything in reply. "Wejust sat
there and listened," a participantrecalled:
[GermanAmbassador]von Kyaw [as Chair] waited to see what would happen. But the second time Austria raised the issue, von Kyaw was very rough
to the Austrian PermanentRepresentative.The AustrianAmbassador said in
COREPER,"Whatis the logical argumentwhy you cannot accept our case?"
Von Kyaw replied very sharply, "We are here meeting very pragmatically,I

95.
96.
97.
98.

Author's interviews, 10 March 1997; 18 May 2000; and 23 May 2000.
Author's interview, 18 May 2000.
Author's interview, 17 February 1997.
Author's interview, 18 March 1997.

962

InternationalOrganization

don't have to explain the logical case to you." He said this very rough and it
was the last we heard of the Austrian derogation.99
Interviews at Austria's permanentrepresentationconfirm that the group rejection
was presentedback in Vienna as a consensus among the other member states for a
maximal interpretationof the directive's application,but that the group gave assurAustria's"black
ances that a review procedurewould enable futurereevaluation.100
eye" in this case is consistent with the delegation's reputationearly in their membership for delivering rigid instructionsand inflexible policy positions in Brussels.
It is plausible that differences between the Greek and Austrian appeals to the
group were partly a function of the latter's noviceness (Austriajoined the EU in
January 1995). One large member state's ambassadorwith senior status among
the group summarizedAustria's behavior in this case as simply, "they were too
new."101 The pattern evidenced here also lends support to Checkel's hypothesis
that socialization is more likely when agents have fewer ingrainedcognitive priors
and beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency's message.102While
it is importantto avoid overstating the difference in tact by Greece and Austria,
the internalizednorms argumentwould account for the difference in argumentation by contrasting two delegations at very different stages of membership and
degrees of internalization.103
The noviceness argumentis also relevant for relating the differential behavior
of Greece and Austria to what this volume calls role-playing (Type I) socialization. As Checkel explains, role-playing socialization involves a process whereby
an agent learns new roles, acquiring the knowledge to act upon them.1" In this
instance, one can code Austrian bargaining behavior as too new to act the role,
compared to Greece's more cautious and informal probing of group support for
some form of limited exemption. A key question for Type I socialization is how
does one know what is a socially expected role in a given community setting?
Austria'sbargainingapproachshows how such a learningprocess among newcomers might work in COREPER,and it representsan importantlearning experience
for them to acquire the knowledge to act on a new role.
Whatever the case, the interviews consistently confirm that the group rejection
of Austria's demand was a key delimiter in derogation negotiations. Indeed, from
this point on, a maximal interpretationof equal treatmentprevailed. For those who
still had outstanding derogation claims-including Denmark, France, and Belgium, as well as Greece's hypothetical and as-yet informal request-the Austrian

99. Author'sinterview,10 March1997.
100. Author'sinterviews,18 March1996;and 10 May 1996.
101. Author'sinterview,by telephoneto nationalcapital,22 April2003.
102. See Checkel, this volume.

103. An ironyhereis thatfew EU specialistswouldcode Greeceas an exemplarat internalizing
EU norms. For an argumentthat Greece is a laggard in adopting EU norms, see Marks 1997.
104. Checkel, this volume.
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rejectionserved as a markerfor the standardsby which derogationargumentswould
be measured.
The final "special" problem was raised by Belgium, which proved to be the
endgame of derogation talks. Because of cleavages between the French, Dutch,
and Germanlanguage communities in Belgium, the directive had the potential to
alter linguistic majorities within municipalities.1'5Strategically,the Belgian delegation waited to present their case until the others' argumentshad been heard.
One ambassadorrecalled that the issue was "How to accept the Belgium problem
without opening the Pandora'sbox of Treatyrevision?" "We were able to do it in
COREPER,"he added, "butit would have been difficult to do in a crowded, mediacized GeneralAffairs Council."106
The Belgian ambassadorrequested a restricted session to clear the room and
said, "Wewill need constitutionalchanges to transposethis directive and the Flemish Chamberwill not accept it without a derogation."Unlike the other failed derogation arguments,the Belgian problem was justified with a persuasive argument,
and one that genuinely convinced the others, even those who were initially skeptical. According to an ambassadorfrom one of the large member states, "Anexample of persuasionand being convinced was the Belgian derogationon local elections.
When I first read it, I thought, 'This is stupid.' But I became convinced they had a
real problem there."107
The Belgian derogationwas settled the following week over lunch (on 7 December), again in the restricted, ambassadors-onlyformat. The terms of the derogation are included as an annex to the directive. Specifically:
Belgium states that if it were to make use of the derogation provided for in
Article 12(2) that derogationwould be applied to only some of the local government units in which the number of voters within the scope of Article 3
exceeded 20% of all voters where the Belgian governmentregardedthe specific situation as justifying an exceptional derogation of that kind.108
The 7 December lunch included a group discussion of how to explain the Belgian derogation to their capitals. As one participantexplained, "we had a discussion of the type of argumentswe could use back to our capitals to explain why
this derogation was necessary."109The ambassadorsfrom France and Denmark
agreed to drop their requests for exemption. The Greek and Austrian delegates
remainedquiet. Portugal'sambassadoralso expressedconfidencethat Lisbon would
agree to abstain, despite instructions to reject any derogation. Before restarting
COREPER after lunch, the ambassadorseach telephoned their foreign ministers
to explain the agreementreached.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

de Wilde d'Estmael and Franck 1996, 40.
Author's interview, 18 March 1997.
Author's interview, 18 May 2000.
Official JournalL 386/47, 31 December 1994.
Ibid.
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The trickiest conversations were with Paris and Lisbon. The French ambassador used his considerable seniority to convince his foreign minister that the directive was acceptable. Likewise, the Portuguese ambassadorsold the compromise
reached in COREPER,but only after a lengthy conversationwith his foreign minister. In this case, the minister and ambassadoragreed that dissatisfaction with the
extent of derogationsdid not warrantthe use (or threat)of veto, but instead it was
decided that Portugal would abstain."0 Portugal's abstention, ratherthan use (or
threat)of the veto, shows how informal norms such as diffuse reciprocity operate
in the context of COREPER's institutional environment and how they can promote pro-normbehavior.Portugal'scarefully weighted decision to abstainfollowing detailed communications between the ambassadorand foreign minister also
displays evidence of what this volume calls strategic calculation. Specifically, the
abstentionwas a creative solution to signal a difference of view while conforming
to normative standardsand the reasoned consensus, and in the process generating
potential "social capital"for the future.Abstaining, in this frameworkof meaning,
is a "self-binding"form of restraintthat can contributeto one's social influence.

Alternative Explanations Revisited: InternalizedNorms or
Diplomacy 101 ?
Critical to showing that this goes beyond simple negotiationtheory,I found ample
evidence of how group discussions collectively legitimated some argumentswhile
rejecting others.The group actively persuadeddelegations with derogationinstructions to accept a strong interpretationof the principle of equal treatment.In some
cases persuasionwas informal and bilateral,in others it was via strategicinterventions of the German presidency, and sometimes (as in the case of Austria), this
persuasion was at the collective COREPERlevel.
As negotiations reached their final stages, the issue of how to handle the Belgian argument was contained within COREPER's institutionalized remit to find
solutions. This differs from the standardlogic of two-level games analysis (that is,
Belgium shows they have "tiedhands"to gain a dispensation)because of the socialization componentinvolved. Withoutthe collective legitimationof derogationclaims
by group-communitystandards,one would have expected the principled commitment to equal treatmentof national and nonnationalEU citizens to unravel at this
stage because of recourse to the veto and the capacity of veto threats to become
credibly linked to the Belgian exception. If this were all about instrumentalrationality, relative power, and the formal decision-rule, one would have expected a

110. As one of the largest "exporters"of EU citizens, Portugalpreferredno derogationsbeyond the
Luxembourgexception. As such, the Portuguese were skeptical of both the French concession regarding scope and the limited territorialapplicationfor Belgium. An official at Portugal'spermrepexplained
that the abstention "was an elegant way to live with the text. It was a special way to avoid disagreement, but to make a political gesture."Author's interview, 10 March 1997.
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style of brinkmanshipby Denmark, France, Greece, and Austria as the Belgian
issue lurked in the backgroundand the 31 December deadline loomed. In short,
one would have seen a different outcome. As the participantssaw it, the Belgian
problem lurked in the backgroundeven before the Belgian ambassadorasked for
a partial,flexible derogation;the issue was more how to justify the Belgian exception without opening the Pandora'sbox of special dispensations for any member
with sensitive national concerns. Reaching a normative consensus on acceptable
derogations was based on group-communitystandardsof fairness, and included
obligations of appropriateself-restraintfor those delegations who lacked persuasive arguments(which helps account for the complete lack of veto threats, even
among "exporter"states such as Portugal).
In the case of Austria's argument, the instrumentalrationale ("Why can't the
group explain the logical case to us") not only failed, but group norms were used
to shame the Austrian position and delegitimize the argument as unacceptable.
The Belgian ambassador,widely considered the doyen of COREPERduring the
late 1980s and 1990s, used his considerable argumentativeresources to convince
the others that the derogation would be of a closed nature, and used as sparingly
as possible. The Belgian derogation unambiguously demonstrates the power of
persuasionand role of argumentativerationalityin everyday EU decision making:
a small state with a "good" argumentconvinced the others, some of whom were
initially skeptical, to accept their claim and in a few cases "go out on a limb" to
sell the agreed results back home to the capital.
The local elections example thus offers empirical support for the internalized
norms argument,and the case evidence displays both Type I and Type II characteristics.Type I internalization-rule-following behaviorbased on socially expected
standardsll"-can be seen in the way those with unconvincing derogation claims
dropped their demands. This includes Denmark, Greece, Austria, and France on
quotas. Evidence of Type I internalizationcan also be seen in the nonaction of
"exporter"states such as Portugal, who logically preferredno derogations at all,
but displayed none of the instrumentalcalculative reasoning (including any hint
of recourseto veto rights) that would be expected in the standardbargainingexplanation. Portugal's abstention is more consistent with the logic of appropriateness
and socially accepted standardsto avoid blockage of the group's "reasonedconsensus" aroundpartial, limited exemption for Belgium, France (on mayoral candidates), and Luxembourg.
Type II internalization-accepting group-communitystandardsas "theright thing
to do" 112-is evidenced by the "reasonedconsensus" legitimating Belgium's plea
for special consideration.The strongestevidence of Type II normativesuasion can
be seen in the actions of the French ambassador.Carefully triangulatedinterview
histories support a characterizationthat he was genuinely persuaded by his Bel-

111. See Checkel, this volume.
112. Ibid.
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gian colleague's argument,after initial doubts, and then went on to convince his
superiors in Paris to accept Belgium's partial exemption while at the same time
dropping the French preference for a quota system. According to the key participants involved, this action was premised on becoming convinced that helping
Belgium was the right thing to do. As one ambassadorput it, "we found understanding in our capitals ... in the end we persuadedour governments, we did it
very much for Belgium." 113
In summary,the local elections case offers evidence that COREPERsocialization affects not only strategies, but also conceptions of the self. Evidence of an
expanded conception of the self, in which permreps practice internalized groupcommunity standardsbased on a noncalculative logic of appropriateness,can be
seen in both the bargainingbehavior and outcome of the local elections case. The
interview and case-study data offer confirmingevidence for the four socialization
measures discussed in section two. First, I have shown noninstrumental selfrestraintamong several delegations after they failed to convince the others of their
argument(including Denmark,France, and Greece). Second, there were numerous
examples of self-enforcing adherenceto informalnorms, such as the "self-control"
of derogation claimants to not explicitly reference veto options or drop reserves
based on favorable cost-benefit ratios. Third, evidence of empathy and otherregarding behavior not linked to calculative reasoning can be seen in the "reasoned consensus" to legitimate Belgium's derogation claim even though several
ambassadors had to sell the validity of Belgium's case to their superiors while
dropping their own claims. Fourth, and finally, this case illustrates the limits on
instrumentalismthrough the collective legitimation of arguments.Restricted sessions were used to collectively accept and reject derogation claims (and "plot"
ways to sell the Belgian derogationto ministers) arounda sharedunderstandingof
maximal interpretationof equal treatment.As a result, the internalizednorms argument can more fully account for the way in which Denmark, France, and Greece
quietly dropped,or chose not to articulate,derogationclaims than can "diplomacy
101." More dramatically,the group rejection of Austria's claim demonstrateshow
collective legitimationplaces limits on instrumentalbehaviorby signaling that certain behavior is just not acceptable. In sum, the constructivistlogic of internalized
norms can better account for both the bargaining behavior and outcomes of the
local elections case than the rationalistlogic of consequences alone.

Conclusion: Blurring the National and the European
COREPER'sinstitutionalarchitecturechallenges the conventional dichotomy that
sharplydemarcatesthe national and Europeanlevels. As a collectivity of memberstate representatives, COREPER exemplifies the imagery of national and Euro-

113. Author's interview, by telephone to national capital, 22 April 2003.
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pean levels of governance becoming amalgamated."14 Accordingly, COREPER's
Janus-like design is an anomaly for theorists who draw rigid distinctions between
"national"and "supranational"agency. For example, in one prominent account
of European integration, the corporate body of "supranationalentrepreneurs"in
the EU is effectively limited to EuropeanCommissioners."5 But the EU permreps belie such a straightforwardpigeonhole. As Wallace puts it, "It would be a
caricatureof this intricatepolicy process to counterposenationalactors and supranational entrepreneursas separate elites, promoting opposed interests."116 The
permreps who participate in weekly COREPERnegotiations and share a collective responsibility to maintain the output of the Council as a whole, nicely illustrate how the logics of consequences and appropriatenesscan interface, which in
turn suggests that national and supranationalidentifications can become complexly intertwined.According to March and Olsen, "Political actors ... calculate
consequences and follow rules, and the relationship between the two is often
subtle."117
Perhaps surprisingly,permrepsdo not self-reflectively see these as competitive
or contradictoryrole/identity sets. My findings are somewhat at odds with others
in this volume, such as Beyers and Hooghe, who offer clear-cutevidence of ranked
"primary"and "secondary"allegiances among EU officials."" A majordifference,
of course, is the point of reference: they are examining the administrativeexpert
level of Council working groups and Commission officials, and both of these display qualitative differences from COREPERin scope conditions as well as what
Egeberg refers to as "organizationalcharacteristics."119
The testimonies of the permrepsinterviewed for this project suggest that identities and role conceptions are not so clearly juxtaposed at this level of the EU
system. Overall, the evidence points to a pattern of symbiosis between national
and collective identities.120 The EU permreps have operationalized the concept
of "double-hatting."121 Instead of limited notions of shifts and transfersof identity, or clearly juxtaposed primary and secondary affiliations, what one sees in
COREPER is a cognitive blurring of the sharp definitional boundaries between
the national and the European.None of this implies national identities are becoming marginalized;rather, what stands out is the interpenetrationof the national

114. H. Wallace 2000, 7.

115. Moravcsik1998,54-60, 479-85.
116. W. Wallace 2000, 529-30.

117. MarchandOlsen 1998,952.
118. See Beyers, this volume; and Hooghe, this volume. See also Egeberg 1999; and Egeberg,

Schaefer,andTrondal2003.
119. Egeberg 2004.

120. The symbiosisanalogyis a trademark
of someof the subtlerfindings(nowoftenoverlooked)
in the early neofunctionalist literatureon the ECSC and EEC. See Haas 1958, 526; and Lindbergand
Scheingold

1970, 94-95.

121. See Laffan2004, 90-94, for a conceptualdiscussion of "doublehatting"among Council actors.
I also thank the editors for suggesting this point.
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with the Europeanand vice versa.122 The identity configurationof the EU permreps is compatible with what Risse suggestively describes as a "marble cake"
concept of multiple identities, in which "the various componentsof an individual's
identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels." 123 On this reading, an
actor's "identitycomponents influence each other"and "mesh and blend."124 Nor
does this in any way imply that socialization effects are homogenous.125 A more
systematic study of socialization processes in COREPER would build controls
into the model for variation caused by preexisting differences in member states'
Europeanpolicy, administrativeculture, and policy styles.'26
Finally, it is worth furtherconsiderationhow the socialization effects identified
in this article are potentially reversible. That is to say, the Brussels-based culture
of decision making, endowed with dense informal norms and standardsof appropriateness,could be undone.First,thereis little, if any, evidence to supporta "holistic" internalizationthesis in which norm compliance becomes automatic.'27Rather,
COREPER socialization is a process of incremental,partial internalization.This
point is evidenced more clearly in my larger multiple-case-study project, where
the British, for example, display a more a la carte adherence to informal norms
when there are principled objections to EU policies (as in social policy).128
This study did find hard evidence of Type II internalization,129 particularlyin
the way those with rejectedderogationclaims convinced theircapitalsand/or "went
out on a limb" to secure the Belgian derogationonce a "reasonedconsensus" was
reached in COREPER-contrary to what standardbargaining theory and instrumental cost-benefit predictions would have expected. But it does not necessarily
follow that a switch from a logic of consequences is complete:just ask the British
if they could find someone else's argumenton fiscal federalism convincing, or the
French if policy toward the Middle East is open to EU deliberationand collective
legitimation norms. In other words, it would be inaccurateto characterizethe interin a holistic sense,
nalizationof group-communitystandardsas "taken-for-granted"
but the bargaining behavior and decisional outcomes documented in this article
do consistently confirm instances of pro-normbehavior as the "rightthing to do."
Second, it is possible to imagine scenarios in which the scope conditions for
this socialization story were fundamentallyaltered:either the density of issue coverage (for example, due to the increased fragmentationof preparatoryauthority

122. For a conceptualization of how "the European dimension is included in national selfconceptions,"see Waever 1995, 412, 430. For a detailed case study on Germany,see Katzenstein 1997.
123. Risse 2004, 251.
124. Ibid., 251-52.
125. See Legro 1997 for a discussion of how pro-normbehavior may exist in "varying strengths"
within a given community.
126. For a detailed analysis of how socialization is affected by domestic organizationalembeddedness, see Beyers, this volume.
127. On "holistic" internalization,see Hurd 1999, 398.
128. Lewis 1998.
129. See Checkel, this volume.
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among rival committees) or insulation (for example, because of domestic political
pressures to address the "democraticdeficit" and increase transparency).Changing the scope conditionswould likely alterwhat neofunctionalistscalled l'engrenage
effects,'30 and it is quite possible that the standardsof appropriatenesswould be
altered as a result. Under altered backgroundconditions or changes in the standards of appropriateness,131 one would expect the identity configuration of EU
permrepsto revert to more egoistic and instrumentalvariants. Under such conditions, pro-normbehavior would become contingent on more explicit and regularized calculation, and agents might use voting weights and veto threatsratherthan
appeals to fairness or principleddebate that would, over time, affect the perceived
legitimacy of the EU's collective decision-making culture.
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